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The politics of semi-presidentialism 
 
Robert Elgie 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of semi-
presidentialism and establishes a framework for the study of the politics 
of semi-presidential regimes. In the first part of the chapter, the evolution 
of the concept of semi-presidentialism will be sketched, some of the main 
criticisms of the concept will be considered, a slight reformulation of the 
standard definition of the term will be proposed and a list of semi-
presidential regimes will be identified. In the second part of the chapter, a 
framework for the comparative study of semi-presidential regimes will be 
outlined. In this way, then, this chapter provides the basis both for the in-
depth country studies of semi-presidentialism which follow and for the 
conclusion which examines the comparative experience of semi-
presidentialism and addresses the issue of whether or not countries 
should adopt a semi-presidential form of government in preference to 
either presidential or parliamentary forms of government. 
 
Semi-presidentialism: the concept and its critics 
 
In a popular context the term ‘semi-presidential regime’ was first used by 
the journalist and founder of the Le Monde newspaper, Hubert Beuve-
Méry, in 1959 (reprinted as Beuve-Méry, 1987).1 At this time, though, the 
meaning of the term still remained rather vague and undefined. In an 
academic context the concept of semi-presidentialism was first elaborated 
by the French political scientist, Maurice Duverger. Duverger first 
employed the term in the 11th edition of his textbook on political 
institutions and constitutional law which appeared in 1970 (Duverger, 
1970, p. 277). He treated the subject in slightly more detail in 1974 
(Duverger, 1974) and his first full-scale work on this theme appeared in 
1978 (Duverger, 1978). In France, then, the term was in regular use and 
was the subject of fierce debate by the end of the 1970s. 
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 Elsewhere, interest in the concept took somewhat more time to 
develop. In 1980, the first article on the subject appeared in English 
written by Duverger himself (Duverger, 1980). In 1983, an international 
conference was held on the theme of semi-presidentialism which included 
contributions from, amongst others, Portuguese and Finnish political 
scientists (published as Duverger, 1986a). In 1984, the first major study 
based on Duverger’s work appeared in Spanish by a South American 
academic (Nogueira Alcalá, 1986). In the early 1990s there was a growing 
German interest in the concept as the process of democratisation gathered 
pace in Eastern Europe and the former USSR. (See, for example, Bahro and 
Veser, 1995; and Steffani, 1995). Overall, by the end of the 1990s, reference 
to the term has become widespread and politics textbooks increasingly 
include a section on semi-presidential regimes. Indeed, in 1997, 
Duverger’s 1980 article was nominated and chosen as one of the most 
influential to have been published in the first 25 years of the history of the 
European Journal of Political Research. 
 The concept of semi-presidentialism, then, has well and truly come 
of age. Since its first formulation, though, it has evolved. Moreover, it has 
consistently been the subject of criticism. Indeed, both the confusion that 
has surrounded and continues to surround the concept and the criticisms 
that have been directed at it suggest that a reformulation of the term is 
required before the study of the politics of semi-presidential regimes can 
undertaken. 
 
The evolution of the concept of semi-presidentialism 
 
The concept of semi-presidentialism has been the source of a certain 
confusion over the years. In particular, there is confusion surrounding 
both the definition of semi-presidentialism and the list of countries which 
should be classed as semi-presidential regimes. In part, this confusion is 
caused by the development of the concept in Duverger’s own work. In 
part, it is caused by how the concept has been applied in the work of 
others. 
 In 1970, Duverger provided the first definition of semi-
presidentialism. He stated that a semi-presidential regime was 
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“characterised by the fact that the head of state is directly elected by 
universal suffrage and that he possesses certain powers which exceed 
those of a head of state in a normal parliamentary regime. However, the 
government still consists of a cabinet formed by a prime minister and 
ministers who can be dismissed by a parliamentary vote” (Duverger, 1970, 
p. 277).2 At this time, according to Duverger, the list of semi-presidential 
regimes comprised three western democracies, Austria, Finland and 
France, to which a fourth, Ireland, was added in the 12th edition of his 
textbook in 1971 (Duverger, 1971, p. 279). In 1974, though, Duverger 
altered the definition of semi-presidentialism somewhat, now stating that 
a semi-presidential regime exhibited three characteristics: “1.) the 
president is elected by universal suffrage … 2.) opposite him, there is a 
prime minister and ministers who can only govern with the confidence of 
parliament … 3.) the president can dissolve parliament …” (Duverger, 
1974, p. 122). At the same time Duverger also revised the list of semi-
presidential regimes by both including Iceland and casting some doubt as 
to whether or not Ireland should in fact be classified as an example of such 
a regime (Duverger, 1974, p. 124). It is apparent, therefore, that up to this 
point at least there was a certain degree of confusion in Duverger’s own 
mind concerning the concept of semi-presidentialism. 
 In fact, Duverger only arrived at both his final definition of semi-
presidentialism and his stock list of semi-presidential regimes in 1978 
(Duverger, 1978, p. 17). It was this 1978 definition which was effectively 
restated in his 1980 article and which, subsequently, has become the 
standard English-language definition of semi-presidentialism. This 
definition is as follows: 
[a] political regime is considered as semi-presidential if the 
constitution which established it combines three elements: 
(1) the president of the republic is elected by universal 
suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he 
has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers 
who possess executive and governmental power and can 
stay in office only if the parliament does not show its 
opposition to them (Duverger, 1980, p. 166). 
Also according to Duverger, six countries should be classed as semi-
presidential: Austria, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland and the then 
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recently-established Portuguese regime. Subsequently, Duverger has 
consistently maintained this definition3 as well as the 1980 list of semi-
presidential regimes, although constitutional developments particularly in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR have led him to 
acknowledge that certain countries, such as Poland and Romania, should 
now be added to the list (Duverger, 1992, p. 901). 
 Since 1978, therefore, Duverger has been consistent in both his 
definition of semi-presidentialism and his classification of semi-
presidential states. Since this time, however, other writers have adopted 
different definitions of semi-presidentialism and have identified different 
examples of semi-presidential regimes. For example, O’Neill uses the term 
‘semi-presidential’ “to refer to those executive systems where (1) 
executive power is divided between a prime minister as head of 
government and a president as head of state, and where (2) substantial 
executive power resides with the presidency” (O’Neill, 1993, p. 197).4 This 
means that, for O’Neill, countries with directly-elected but weak 
presidents, such as Austria, Iceland and Ireland, should not be classed as 
semi-presidential, whereas countries with indirectly-elected but strong 
presidents, such as Albania and (formerly) Czechoslovakia, should be 
classed as such. In a similar vein, Sartori states that a political system is 
semi-presidential if five properties jointly apply (Sartori, 1997, pp. 130-1). 
These include the conditions that the president must be popularly elected, 
that the prime minister must be parliament-dependent and that the 
president must share executive power with the prime minister. This 
means that, for Sartori at least, the list of semi-presidential regimes 
consists only of Finland, France and, arguably, Sri Lanka. Furthermore, 
Linz argues, more succinctly, that semi-presidential systems are those 
which “have a president who is elected by the people either directly or 
indirectly, rather than nominated by parliament, and a prime minister 
who needs the confidence of parliament” (Linz, 1994, p. 48). For Linz, this 
means that Finland, France and Portugal are the primary examples of 
semi-presidential countries. 
 It is apparent, then, that there has been and there continues to be a 
degree of confusion concerning the concept of semi-presidentialism. 
Different people mean different things by the term and different people 
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classify different countries as examples of semi-presidential regimes. 
Needless to say, this causes problems both for the student of semi-
presidentialism and, it may be argued, for the very appropriateness of the 
concept itself. 
 
Criticisms of Duverger’s concept of semi-presidentialism 
 
Even though reference to semi-presidentialism (however defined) has 
become widespread, there has always been and, indeed, there continues to 
be a certain amount of opposition to the concept. For example, in 1979 a 
leading French academic, Georges Vedel, stated that: “at best, a semi-
presidential regime is only a convenient name given to a succession of 
contrary political practices closely linked to political changes” (Le Monde, 
19-20 February, 1979). Similarly, Shugart and Carey found Duverger’s use 
of the concept to be “misleading” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 230) and 
instead preferred to formulate the concept of ‘premier-presidentialism’. It 
goes without saying that Duverger himself is very aware of these 
criticisms. Indeed, as we shall see, he is quite dismissive of some of them, 
particularly those which emanate from his French colleagues. At the same 
time, however, it is necessary to examine the objections to the concept of 
semi-presidentialism in order better to understand the meaning and 
implications of the term. In this context, four common criticisms of semi-
presidentialism can be identified. The first two, it will be argued, are 
misdirected, whereas the final two raise issues which need to be 
addressed and which necessitate a slight reformulation of Duverger’s 
definition. 
 
i. The terminological criticism 
 
One frequent criticism of semi-presidentialism concerns the term itself. 
Some writers simply object to Duverger’s terminology. So, for example, 
Duhamel states that Duverger’s use of the word is “disputable” (Duhamel, 
1993, p. 158). In this context, there are two forms of this criticism. Some 
writers suggest that the term is satisfactory but that other terms are 
equally satisfactory, whereas others suggest that the term is unsatisfactory 
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and should be substituted for a different term. Both objections, it might be 
argued, miss the mark. 
 The work of Linz and Stepan and Suleiman provides examples of 
the first terminological criticism. Both sets of writers accept the term 
‘semi-presidential’ but argue that it is synonymous with the term ‘semi-
parliamentary’ (Linz, 1994, p. 48; Linz, 1997; Stepan and Suleiman, 1995, p. 
394). For writers such as these, the term ‘semi-presidential’ is, thus, 
potentially misleading because it can be substituted by another term 
which is equally valid. In response, it might be argued that this criticism is 
insignificant. After all, what does it matter which term is used if the 
subsequent methodology is valid? Duverger argues, however, that it does 
matter and that the term ‘semi-presidential’ is the most appropriate one to 
use. In opposition to writers such as Linz and Stepan and Suleiman, he 
states that there is a significant distinction between the terms ‘semi-
presidential’ and ‘semi-parliamentary’. For him, this distinction is to be 
found in the essential difference between a presidential regime and a 
parliamentary regime. In the former there are two sources of popular 
legitimacy (presidential elections and legislative elections), whereas in the 
latter there is only one (legislative elections). To the extent that in semi-
presidential regimes there are also two sources of popular legitimacy 
(presidential elections and legislative elections), then it is quite 
appropriate to call such regimes ‘semi-presidential’ (Duverger, 1986a, p. 
8).5 For Duverger at least, then, it is clear that the terms ‘semi-presidential’ 
and ‘semi-parliamentary’ are not simply synonymous, that the term ‘semi-
presidentialism’ is used to mean something quite specific and that is the 
most appropriate term to use to describe the countries that Duverger 
wishes to examine. 
 The work of Shugart and Carey provides an example of the second 
objection to Duverger’s terminology. They have argued that the term is 
misleading because the use of the prefix ‘semi’ implies that semi-
presidential regimes are “located midway along some continuum running 
from presidential to parliamentary” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 23). 
Consequently, they prefer to use the term ‘premier-presidentialism’ where 
no half-way house situation is implied. To a certain extent Duverger is 
guilty of bringing this criticism on himself. In an early work he stated that 
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the Finnish system is a “truly intermediate regime between a presidential 
and a parliamentary regime” (Duverger, 1974, p. 131). However, this is 
not what Duverger now argues and, in any case, the logic behind Shugart 
and Carey’s argument is muddled. Sartori, for one, is quite dismissive of 
their approach. He believes that the term ‘semi-presidential’ does not at all 
imply that such regimes are situated half-way along a 
presidential/parliamentary continuum. He points out that the prefix “semi 
is the Latin for ‘half’, and - as any dictionary would show for hundreds of 
expressions - does not assume any continuum because it proceeds 
continuum-mania by well over two thousand years” (Sartori, 1997, p. 137). 
Lijphart, too, springs to Duverger’s defence, although his language is 
rather more understated. He notes that “Duverger’s concept of semi-
presidentialism is multi-facted and does not entail any intermediate 
distance between presidentialism and parliamentarism” (Lijphart, 1997, p. 
126). In this sense, then, Shugart and Carey’s line of thought appears 
fundamentally flawed. 
 Overall, then, it does appear as if Duverger has reasonable grounds 
to argue that the term ‘semi-presidentialism’ means something quite 
distinct and that this term should be used in preference to alternative 
terms when examining the politics of particular countries. 
 
ii. The mixed regime criticism 
 
Another common criticism of the concept of semi-presidentialism is that a 
semi-presidential regime is a mixed type of regime and, as such, is 
somehow intellectually out of place. Once again, it might be argued that 
this criticism is unfounded. 
 Some writers argue that semi-presidentialism implies a mixed 
regime type. As such, it does not constitute a ‘pure’ regime type, like 
presidentialism or parliamentarism, and so it does not have the same 
conceptual validity as these other more standard types of regimes. So, for 
example, Pactet argues that “mixed regimes combine elements borrowed 
from presidential and parliamentary regimes, which with regard to the 
way that they function sometimes raises the problem of their coherence” 
(Pactet, 1995, p. 153). Equally, Conac quotes de Tocqueville’s objection to 
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the very concept of mixed regimes and argues that semi-presidential 
regimes function either as presidential regimes or parliamentary regimes 
(Conac, 1992, p. 817). Similarly, Vedel in a much quoted article argues that 
the supposedly semi-presidential French Fifth Republic is not a synthesis 
of presidential and parliamentary systems (and in this sense a stand-alone 
regime type), but that it alternates between the two (Le Monde, 19-20 
February, 1979, p. 2).6 Indeed, the notion that semi-presidential states 
alternate between presidential and parliamentary phases is a further 
component of Shugart and Carey’s objection to the term (Shugart and 
Carey, 1992, p. 23). In these ways, then, all of these writers object to the 
concept of semi-presidentialism because it is considered to be an impure, 
hybrid or ‘bastard’ concept (Bahro and Veser, 1995). 
 Again, Duverger is at least partly responsible for provoking this 
criticism. For example, in his 1980 article he stated that semi-presidential 
systems were “intermediary between presidential and parliamentary 
systems” (Duverger, 1980, p. 165). Even recently he stated that a semi-
presidential regime is “part presidential, part parliamentary” (Duverger, 
1991, p. 109). However, whether or not Duverger is culpable, it is certainly 
the case that he pulls no punches in his opposition to those who voice this 
criticism. For example, in one article he stated: “the term semi-presidential 
regime is still boycotted by French jurists who continue to venerate only 
two sacred cows: the parliamentary regime and the presidential regime” 
(Duverger, 1986b, p. 347). Similarly, in another he writes: “widely adopted 
in Portugal, accepted in Finland, used in Anglo-Saxon countries, the 
notion of a semi-presidential regime is still controversial in France … the 
majority of French constitutionalists (apart from the most serious of them) 
still maintain a fetishistic cult towards this dualistic vision [of 
parliamentary and presidential regimes] and consider anything which 
might complement it with a new model to be sacrilegious …” (Duverger, 
1992, pp. 901-2). 
 In fact, as Duverger implies, the mixed regime criticism is 
misdirected. There is no reason why a semi-presidential regime should be 
considered a mixed regime at all. Instead, as Pasquino states, semi-
presidential regimes constitute a “specific and separate” form of 
government (Pasquino, 1995, p. 57). They possess their own 
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“appropriately devised institutional features” (Pasquino, 1997, p. 129) and 
“what is required for the construction of semi-presidential systems is an 
explicit, purposive and well designed act of institutional and 
constitutional engineering” (ibid). So, while it is certainly the case that 
Finnish constitution-builders did not state that they were creating a semi-
presidential regime in 1919, that the Fifth Republic’s founders were 
ignorant of the term in 1958, that the Bulgarian constitution states that the 
regime is parliamentary and so on, it is also the case that the political 
institutions in these countries and others were arrived at purposefully and 
that collectively they constitute a specific and separate regime type. It 
follows, then, that: “Presidential systems cannot simply, so to speak, lapse 
into semi-presidential systems nor can parliamentary systems jump into 
semi-presidential systems” (Pasquino, 1997, p. 129). As such, semi-
presidential countries do not alternate between presidential and 
parliamentary regimes. On the contrary, these countries simply exhibit 
various forms of political practice within the same basic constitutional 
structure and, in this sense, within the same regime type. In this way, 
semi-presidential regimes are just as ‘pure’ as presidential or 
parliamentary regimes which also exhibit equally varying forms of 
political practice at different times (see below). 
 
iii.) The ambiguity of the direct election criterion 
 
In contrast to the two previous objections, a relatively minor but 
nevertheless cogent criticism of semi-presidentialism stems from the 
wording of Duverger’s standard definition. 
 The first element of Duverger’s definition states that “the president 
of the republic is elected by universal suffrage”. For some, this wording is 
problematic because it implies that the president is directly elected. And 
yet, certain countries which Duverger classifies as semi-presidential 
appear not to meet this criterion. Most notably, this was said to be the case 
for Finland where the president was chosen by an electoral college prior to 
the reform of the country’s electoral system in 1988. For example, Stepan 
and Skach argue that “from 1925 to 1988 the Finnish president was not so 
much directly elected but indirectly chosen by party blocs” (Stepan and 
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Skach, 1993, p. 5). Similarly, Shugart and Carey state that: “Given its 
party-centred character, [the election of the president] was not much 
different from election in parliament” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 213). It 
should be added that a similar criticism might be levelled against the Irish 
case. Here, there is a long tradition of parties conspiring to nominate an 
agreed presidential candidate (see Chapter 6). In this situation, the 
election is dispensed with altogether and the candidate is elected 
unopposed. Consequently, some Irish presidents have assumed power 
without having been directly elected at all which, again, might be seen to 
cause a problem for Duverger’s analysis. 
 For Duverger, this criticism is largely irrelevant. For example, he 
acknowledges that prior to the 1988 reform the Finnish president was only 
elected indirectly and concedes that the nature of the electoral system was 
such that it led to “an election by notables much more than a popular 
election” (Duverger, 1978, p. 58). However, he also insists that election by 
notables is not the same as election by parties as in a parliamentary system 
(ibid) and that the Finnish system resembled the US system where strictly 
speaking the president is also elected by an electoral college (Duverger, 
1978, p. 64). So, Duverger saw nothing in Finland’s (pre-reform) electoral 
system which was essentially incompatible with its status as a semi-
presidential regime. Equally, he saw nothing in the Irish propensity 
towards uncontested elections which might threaten its status either 
(Duverger, 1978, p. 86). 
 While this may be a reasonable line of argument, it must also be 
acknowledged that there is at least some degree of ambiguity in this 
aspect of Duverger’s definition and that this ambiguity needs to be 
addressed. So, for example, in his definition of semi-presidentialism 
Sartori prefers to adopt a more stringent criterion. He states that an 
essential characteristic of a semi-presidential regime is that the president 
“is elected by a popular vote - either directly or indirectly - for a fixed 
term of office” (Sartori, 1997, p. 131). Indeed, he insists on this wording at 
some length because he considers that US and (pre-reform) Finnish-style 
indirect elections closely resemble Latin American-style direct elections 
particularly in that all are increasingly susceptible to what he calls ‘video-
politics’ or the opportunity for political outsiders to by-pass the party 
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system and manipulate television in the pursuit of votes. Thus, he prefers 
to reword Duverger’s original definition so as not to risk excluding 
countries like Finland from the list of semi-presidential regimes. To avoid 
confusion, this seems to be a sensible solution. It is appropriate, therefore, 
to adopt Sartori’s approach. 
 
iv. The problem of presidential powers 
 
The final problem with the concept of semi-presidentialism is also derived 
from the wording of Duverger’s standard definition. This time, the 
problems stems from the second element of the definition which states 
that in a semi-presidential regime the president “possesses quite 
considerable powers”. This wording provokes writers to make one or 
other of two objections: either that the concept of semi-presidentialism is 
incoherent and should be ditched altogether or that the concept is 
coherent but that Duverger’s list of semi-presidential regimes should be 
revised. The first objection, it might be argued, is unfounded, but the 
second does suggest that there is a problem with Duverger’s definition 
which needs to be addressed. 
 The first objection of this sort is made by those writers who focus 
on Duverger’s standard list of semi-presidential regimes. These writers 
note that the list contains some countries with very strong presidents and 
others with very weak presidents. This, they suggest, undermines the 
whole concept of semi-presidentialism because it lumps together countries 
which are too dissimilar. For example, Nogueira Alcalá states that from a 
purely legal point there are indeed six West European semi-presidential 
regimes (Nogueira Alcalá, 1986, p. 134). However, he also states that from 
a political point of view the term ‘semi-presidential’ leads to a 
“misleading appreciation” of the Austrian, Icelandic and Irish cases where 
there are weak presidents and argues that it is clearer and “more exact” to 
classify all six countries as having a “dual executive with a presidential 
corrective” (Nogueira Alcalá, 1986, p. 135). Similarly, Cohendet states that 
Austria, Iceland and Ireland are parliamentary, that Portugal is only 
intermittently semi-presidential, that Finland was for a long time an 
exceptional case because of its proximity to the USSR and that the only 
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real example of a semi-presidential regime is France (Cohendet, 1993, pp. 
74-5). Consequently, she prefers to distinguish between monist 
birepresentative parliamentary regimes (in which there are two sources of 
popular authority but only one controlling power, presidential or prime 
ministerial), such as Austria, France, Iceland and Ireland, and dualist 
birepresentative parliamentary regimes (in which there are two sources of 
popular authority and two controlling powers, presidential and prime 
ministerial), such as Finland and Portugal (Cohendet, 1993, p. 77). Finally, 
Shugart and Carey respond to this problem by distinguishing between 
premier-presidential regimes, which indicates the primacy of the prime 
minister as well as the presence of a president with significant powers, 
president-parliamentary regimes, which establish the primacy of the 
president and the dependence of the cabinet on parliament, and 
parliamentary (with president) regimes, where the popularly-elected head 
of state is simply a figurehead (Shugart and Carey, 1992, pp. 18-27). 
 Duverger has always been quick to reply to this line of argument. 
His standard defence is to point out that similarly diverse political 
practices occur in other more uncontroversial regime types. For example, 
in 1978, he argued that, despite the fact that the German and Italian 
systems work so differently, “everyone puts [them] in the same category: 
parliamentary regimes” (Duverger, 1978, p. 18). He then goes on to add: 
“It is no more (or less) artificial to place France, the Weimar Republic, 
Finland, Austria, Iceland, Ireland and Portugal in another category: semi-
presidential regimes …” (ibid). More recently, Duverger has reiterated 
this argument, stating that parliamentary regimes are just as diverse as 
semi-presidential regimes: “you only have to compare the institutions in 
London with those in Rome to be aware of this” (Duverger, 1991, p. 113). 
By 1992, Duverger was once again comparing the German and Italian 
systems, concluding that “parliamentary regimes demonstrate just as 
much heterogeneity [as semi-presidential regimes]” (Duverger, 1992, p. 
902). 
 For Duverger, then, the fact that political practice in the six West 
European semi-presidential regimes is so diverse does not mean that the 
concept of semi-presidentialism is undermined. Instead, it is simply a 
reflection of the fact that countries with the same basic constitutional 
 13 
structure can operate in a variety of different ways. In this respect, 
Duverger’s argument is sound. There is indeed just as much diversity 
amongst parliamentary regimes as semi-presidential regimes. Indeed, it 
might be added that there is just as much diversity amongst presidential 
regimes as semi-presidential regimes. For example, the US operates very 
differently to Mexico and yet both countries are unequivocally classed as 
presidential. Therefore, the fact that there is indeed a variety of political 
practice across semi-presidential regimes does not undermine the 
fundamental validity of the concept itself. 
 The second objection of this type is made by those writers who take 
Duverger’s definition literally and who then proceed to reconstitute the 
list of semi-presidential countries. They accept the validity of the concept 
of semi-presidentialism but note that it only includes countries which 
have presidents who possess “quite considerable powers”. They then 
proceed to eliminate countries with weak presidents from the list of semi-
presidential regimes. So, for example, when identifying semi-presidential 
regimes Mainwaring states that “what matters is whether [presidential] 
offices are largely symbolic or, conversely, whether the office holders 
wield considerable power” (Mainwaring, 1993, p. 203). On the basis of this 
logic, he argues that there are just two stable semi-presidential 
democracies, Finland and France (Mainwaring, 1993, p. 205). On the basis 
of a similar logic, Stepan and Skach also noted only two examples of semi-
presidential regimes, France and Portugal (Stepan and Skach, 1993, p. 9). 
Equally, Ieraci named just one, France (Ieraci, 1994, p. 63). These writers, 
then, accept that there is such a thing as a semi-presidential regime but 
classify only those countries with relatively strong presidents as examples 
of such a regime. As a result, the list of semi-presidential countries varies 
from one writer to another according to each writer’s subjective 
judgement as to what constitutes a ‘relatively strong president’.7 
 In contrast to the previous objection, it might be argued that there 
is some justification for this line of argument but, it might also be argued, 
this does not mean that the list of presidential regimes should be redrawn. 
It is certainly the case that the wording of Duverger’s definition invites 
people to eliminate from the list of semi-presidential regimes those 
countries whose presidents do not possess “quite considerable powers”. 
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As things stand, therefore, writers such as Mainwaring, Stepan and Skach 
and Ieraci are interpreting Duverger’s definition quite logically and 
consistently. And yet, it might also be argued that there is a basic problem 
with their approach. This is because it allows different writers to provide 
their own interpretation of the powers of presidents and to draw up their 
own preferred list of semi-presidential regimes on the basis of this 
interpretation. In other words, it allows the classification of regime types 
to become an essentially subjective exercise. (See the argument in Elgie, 
1998). However, this subjectivity should be avoided because it poses 
problems for the study of comparative politics. The very reason for 
establishing concepts such as presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism is so as to be able to compare similar regime types more 
accurately. So, if different writers are able to draw up their own subjective 
list of semi-presidential regimes, then it follows that those writers will not 
be comparing like with like and so the basis of the comparison is 
weakened. (This point will be considered in more depth in the last 
chapter).  
 This suggests, then, a problem with the interpretation of 
Duverger’s definition. This problem is caused by Duverger’s stipulation 
that a semi-presidential regime must exhibit a president who possesses 
“quite considerable powers”. In order to eliminate this problem, what is 
needed is a definition of semi-presidentialism which excludes the 
opportunity for subjective classifications of semi-presidential countries 
and establishes a clear-cut list of semi-presidential regimes. This can only 
be achieved if Duverger’s definition is slightly reformulated. Only then 
will it be possible to arrive at an unambiguous list of semi-presidential 
regimes which promotes the objective study of comparative politics (Elgie, 
1998). 
 
Reformulating the concept of semi-presidentialism 
 
It has been demonstrated both that the concept of semi-presidentialism 
has been the subject of a degree of confusion over the years and also that 
the criticisms of both the first and second elements of Duverger’s standard 
definition are to an extent justified. Thus, it is necessary to reformulate the 
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concept of semi-presidentialism so as to dispel the confusion and take 
account of these criticisms. To this end, therefore, the following 
reformulation will be proposed. A semi-presidential regime may be 
defined as the situation where a popularly-elected fixed-term president 
exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to 
parliament.8 
 This is a purely constitutional definition of the concept.9 Moreover, 
it is a definition which is simply indicates the ways in which the head of 
state and head of government come to office and how they remain in 
office. It does not make any assumptions about the actual powers of these 
two actors. This is also a clear and straightforward definition of semi-
presidentialism which has the advantage of remaining very close to 
Duverger’s standard definition.10 Moreover, it has two further 
advantages. Firstly, it takes account of Sartori’s point that the first element 
of Duverger’s definition is potentially misleading. It does so by replacing 
the implication that a directly-elected president is needed for a semi-
presidential regime with the notion that a popularly-elected president is 
required, meaning a president who is directly elected or is elected in a 
‘direct-like’ manner. So, countries such as pre-reform Finland can 
unequivocally be classed as semi-presidential regimes. Secondly, it omits 
altogether the second element of Duverger’s definition which refers to 
presidential powers. This means that the problems caused by this 
reference are removed. As such, countries with weak presidents, such as 
Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland and Ireland, can unequivocally be classed as 
semi-presidential alongside countries with strong presidents, such as 
France and Russia, as well as countries with some sort of limited 
presidency, such as Finland, Poland and Portugal. In this way, then, semi-
presidentialism emerges as an example of a pure type of regime which 
exists alongside other such pure types, most notably, presidential regimes 
and parliamentary regimes (Elgie, 1998). 
 On the basis of this definition, a list of regimes which can 
unambiguously be classed as ‘semi-presidential’ can be established. (See, 
Figure 1.1).11 
 
Figure 1.1 
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Examples of semi-presidential regimes by region 
 
Africa Americas Asia/ 
Middle 
East 
Central and 
Eastern 
Europe 
Former-
USSR 
Western 
Europe 
 
Angola 
Benin 
B. Faso 
Cape Verde 
Gabon 
Ghana 
Madagasca
r 
Mali 
Namibia 
Niger 
Togo 
 
Dominican 
Rep. 
Guyana 
Haiti 
 
Lebanon 
Maldives 
Mongolia 
S. Korea 
Sri Lanka 
 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Macedonia 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovenia 
 
 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lithuania 
Moldova 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
Austria 
Finland 
France 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Portugal 
 
This list includes the six West European countries that Duverger has 
consistently identified as being semi-presidential. It also includes the large 
number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR 
which adopted a semi-presidential form of government after 1989 or 1991. 
It includes the two most frequently discussed examples in South and 
South-East Asia, Sri Lanka and South Korea respectively. Finally, it 
includes a large number of semi-presidential regimes in Africa and a small 
number in the Americas. Overall, if a head count of regime types in 
democratic political systems were to be conducted, it would find that 
semi-presidentialism is more widespread than presidentialism (although 
less so in Central and South America) and is perhaps only slightly less 
widespread than parliamentarism (although more so in Central and 
Eastern Europe and countries of the former USSR). 
 By definition, semi-presidential regimes share the same basic 
constitutional structure. They all have presidents who are elected in a 
direct or direct-like manner and they all have prime ministers and 
cabinets who are responsible to the legislature. As has already been 
indicated, though, in practice semi-presidential countries operate in many 
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different ways. The constitutional power of presidents, prime ministers 
and cabinets varies just as the political power of presidents, prime 
ministers and cabinets varies. Most notably, constitutionally strong 
presidents are sometimes politically weak and constitutionally weak 
presidents are sometimes politically strong. Presidents sometimes 
dominate prime ministers. Prime ministers sometimes dominate 
presidents. Sometimes neither one dominates the other. In order to 
examine the politics of semi-presidentialism, therefore, it is necessary to 
establish a framework which captures the variety of political practices 
from one country to another. This is the aim of the next section. 
 
The politics of semi-presidential countries 
 
Duverger has frequently reiterated that “the purpose of the concept of 
semi-presidential government is to explain why relatively homogeneous 
constitutions are applied in radically different ways” (Duverger, 1980, p. 
177). For Duverger, then, the concept of semi-presidentialism is as much 
an heuristic device as a description of a particular set of constitutional 
arrangements (Duverger, 1986c, p. 8; Duverger, 1986b, p. 349; and 
Duverger, 1982, p. 193). For him, the principal advantage of such a device 
is that it “permits the construction of an analytical model which allows the 
in-depth explanation of how these regimes function …” (Duverger, 1986c, 
p. 14). Moreover, also according to him, “it is not only a question of 
explaining past and present incarnations of semi-presidential regimes but 
also predicting their future incarnations …” (Duverger, 1978, pp. 89-90). 
The basis of this analytical model is the identification of the appropriate 
set of variables which account for why semi-presidential regimes operate 
in such different ways. 
 Those who have followed Duverger have frequently identified 
their own set of variables. For example, Bartolini states that factors 
exogenous to the institutional system need to be identified in order to 
account for why countries with the same constitutional features operate in 
practice so differently (Bartolini, 1984, p. 225). For him, four factors are 
important: the politico-cultural origins of the regime in question; the 
process by which presidential and parliamentary candidates are selected; 
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the relationship between presidential and parliamentary electoral systems; 
and the relationship between the president and party-system coalition-
building (Bartolini, 1984, pp. 226-7). In a similar vein, Linz argues that “it 
is impossible to analyze the performance of a bipolar regime 
independently of the larger political system …” (Linz, 1994, p. 51) and in 
this respect he singles out two factors which are particularly important, 
the party system and the “complex historical situation” (ibid). Equally, in 
his analysis of semi-presidential regimes Pasquino focuses on two 
variables, the electoral system and the party system (Pasquino, 1995, p. 
59). 
 It is apparent from this list that there is at least some degree of 
consensus as to the factors which most appropriately explain the variety 
of practices to be found in semi-presidential regimes. As might be 
expected by now, though, the list of factors which Duverger himself 
identifies has varied over the years.12 In general, however, Duverger’s list 
reinforces this consensus. For the most part, Duverger considers three 
variables to be of particular significance: the constitutional powers of the 
major political actors; the events surrounding the formation of the regime; 
and the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between 
the president and the majority. Each of these variables will briefly be 
considered. 
 
The constitutional powers of the major political actors 
 
As noted above, by definition semi-presidential regimes all operate 
according to the same basic constitutional procedure. Over and above 
these procedures, though, the constitutional powers of presidents, prime 
ministers and parliaments vary. This variety helps to account for the 
diversity of semi-presidential politics. 
 For Duverger, variations in constitutional powers can be captured 
by reference to three general types of situations. The first type is where the 
president is merely a “controlling force” (Duverger, 1980, p. 177). In this 
situation, the president simply acts as the guardian of the constitution and 
may have the right, for example, to refer laws to the constitutional court 
and propose a constitutional referendum. The second type represents an 
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intermediate situation in which the president enjoys these controlling 
powers and also has the unilateral right to dismiss the prime minister 
(ibid). The third type is where the president is a “governing” force  
(Duverger, 1980, p. 178). In this situation, the president “shares in the 
running of the country, in collaboration with the prime minister and the 
cabinet” (ibid). 
 Even though Duverger distinguishes between these three types of 
constitutional situations, he also takes great pains to emphasise that 
constitutional rules and political practice do not always coincide. In some 
cases presidents who would appear to be in a position only to operate as a 
controlling force in fact operate as a governing force and in other cases the 
opposite is true. It would be wrong to conclude from this, though, that 
Duverger believes constitutional powers to be irrelevant to the practice of 
semi-presidential regimes. Indeed, he clearly states that “the constitution 
plays a certain part in the application of presidential powers” (Duverger, 
1980, p. 179). Nevertheless, he also states that constitutional factors remain 
only “secondary compared to the other parameters” (ibid). 
 In this way, therefore, in order to understand the comparative 
politics of semi-presidential regimes and the reasons why such regimes 
operate so differently, it is appropriate to outline the constitutional 
powers of presidents, prime ministers and parliaments. It is necessary to 
know whether the president can dismiss the prime minister, dissolve the 
legislature, appoint government ministers, assume emergency powers and 
so on. Collectively, these powers indicate both the de jure balance of power 
between the various political actors and they also usually provide at least 
a hint (and sometimes more) of the de facto relationship between them as 
well. 
 
 
The events surrounding the formation of the regime 
 
The second factor which helps to explain the variety of semi-presidential 
regimes concerns the historical, or politico-cultural, context within which 
the regime was created. It is hardly surprising that this factor should be 
invoked to explain the variety of semi-presidential regimes because, 
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necessarily, each country’s context is unique. This contextual factor, then, 
helps to engender national differences that persist over time and which 
can distort the operation of the set of de jure constitutional rules. 
 Each country operates within a given geographical area, against the 
background of a particular historical situation and according to the 
dynamics of a specific constitutional foundation. Nevertheless, certain 
similarities can be traced from one country to another. Three common 
types of context can be singled out. The first type concerns the situation 
where a semi-presidential regime is adopted for purely symbolic reasons. 
This may occur, for example, when the adoption of semi-presidentialism 
is associated with the process of national self-determination. For example, 
if prior to independence the head of state was a foreign monarch, then the 
subsequent creation of a semi-presidential regime with a popularly 
elected president may be motivated by the desire to reinforce the 
democratic credentials of the new regime rather than the desire to install a 
powerful head of state. In these cases, then, semi-presidentialism may 
coincide with a weak presidency. The second type concerns the situation 
where a semi-presidential regime is adopted for reasons of governability. 
This may occur, for example, when a semi-presidential regime is adopted 
following the collapse of, say, a parliamentary system of government. 
Here, there may be a desire to create a strong leadership figure who will 
give direction to the new regime and prevent a repeat of the previous 
situation. In these cases, semi-presidentialism may coincide with a strong 
presidency. The third type concerns the situation where a semi-
presidential regime is adopted during the transition to democracy. Here, 
one of several motivations may be present. For example, the presidency 
may be tailor-made for the leading figure in the democratisation process, 
so creating the conditions for a strong president. Equally, the presidency 
may be designed so as to prevent one person from assuming too much 
power, so creating the conditions for a weak president. Alternatively, the 
establishment of the regime may be the product of a ‘fudge’. In this case, 
the powers of president, prime minister and parliament may be shared. 
Whatever the situation, the context surrounding the creation of the regime 
creates the opportunity for a great variety of political practices to occur 
across the set of semi-presidential countries. 
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 In his work, Duverger stresses the importance of the “combination 
of tradition and circumstances” (Duverger, 1980, p. 180) in the evolution 
of semi-presidential systems. Moreover, Duverger stresses not just the 
importance of, as it were, the moment of constitution-building but also the 
conventions of political practice that endure thereafter. As Duverger 
states, countries develop a “factual tradition” (ibid). They initiate rules, 
norms and procedures which subsequently become fossilised. In this 
context, the presidency of the first incumbent of the presidential office is 
often very important. If the first president is a figurehead, then the 
chances are that a figurehead presidency will become the norm. By 
contrast, if the first president is an authoritative decision-maker, then, the 
likelihood is that a working presidency will be established. Whatever the 
outcome, it is apparent that events surrounding the formation of the 
regime are central to an understanding of the politics of semi-
presidentialism. 
 
The nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the 
president and the majority 
 
Since the first formulation of the concept Duverger has stressed that party 
political factors are fundamental to the operation of semi-presidential 
regimes. For example, in 1971 he stated that: “the structure of parties and 
the relationship between them is more important than constitutional 
powers” when explaining why semi-presidential regimes function so 
differently (Duverger, 1971, p. 116). By 1978, Duverger has settled on his 
standard formulation of this variable stating that the mechanics of semi-
presidential regimes vary according to the nature of the parliamentary 
majority and the relationship between the president and the majority.13 
 The nature of the parliamentary majority can take a number of 
forms. The first case concerns the situation where there is an absolute 
parliamentary majority. Here, various scenarios present themselves. On 
occasions there may be a monolithic majority, implying that a single party 
enjoys a majority of seats in the legislature. On other occasions there may 
a coalition majority with one dominant party, meaning that the position of 
the dominant party is strong but less so than in the previous situation. On 
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yet other occasions there may a balanced coalition majority, suggesting 
that power is shared between the majority parties in parliament. On all 
occasions the government’s position is likely to be safe but only in the first 
scenario is the problem of inter-party bargaining likely to be absent. The 
second case concerns the situation where there is only a relative or quasi-
majority in parliament. In this case, one party has more seats in 
parliament than any other but lacks an overall majority. Here, the position 
of the leading party may either be quite secure if it takes an ‘unholy 
alliance’ of political opponents to combine to bring the government down 
or it may be perilous if there is an alternative government waiting in the 
wings. The final case concerns the situation where there is no 
parliamentary majority at all. Here, the seats in parliament are shared 
between a large number of small parties and governments are supported 
by unstable and shifting coalitions. 
 Just as the nature of the parliamentary majority can take a number 
of forms, so too can the relationship between the president and the 
majority. For example, the president may be the leader of the majority or 
she or he may simply be a member of the majority. Equally, the president 
may be from the opposition or, alternatively, she or he may be a 
completely neutral figure altogether. By themselves, these various 
situations tell us very little about the type of semi-presidential regime 
which is likely to ensue. Instead, they only help to explain the differences 
between semi-presidential regimes when each is combined with the 
various forms of parliamentary majority that can occur. So, for example, 
Duverger argues that a president who is the leader of a monolithic 
majority will emerge as an absolute (republican) monarch (Duverger, 
1980, p. 186). By contrast, a president who is simply the member of a party 
which only has a relative parliamentary majority will operate as a 
symbolic figurehead leader (ibid). Overall, in his classic work on semi-
presidentialism Duverger identified 17 separate situations which may 
arise by combining the various forms of the parliamentary majority and 
the various relationships between the president and the majority (ibid). 
Thereafter this number was reduced (Duverger, 1982, p. 230) but the basic 
argument remained the same, namely that the politics of semi-
presidentialism varies as a function of party political factors. 
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Conclusion 
 
This book examines the politics of semi-presidentialism. In particular, it 
examines the politics of European semi-presidentialism focusing on the 
experience of a large number of semi-presidential regimes in Central  and 
Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the former USSR. In this context, the 
main question which is being asked is the following: why do countries 
which share the same basic institutional structure operate so differently in 
practice? As we have seen, Duverger’s work on semi-presidentialism 
provides a framework with which we can begin to answer this question. 
As such, in the chapters which follow particular attention will be paid to 
the constitutional powers of political actors, the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the regime, the nature of the parliamentary 
majority and the relationship between the president and that majority. At 
the same time, though, other factors will also be shown to be important in 
particular countries and these will be identified when and where 
appropriate. In the conclusion we will consider what the experience of 
semi-presidentialism tells us about the academic debate concerning 
comparative institutional engineering and the pros and cons of 
presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary regimes. 
Notes to Chapter 1 
                                                 
1 Duverger himself acknowledges that Beuve-Méry was the first to use the 
term (Duverger, 1992, p. 901). 
2 Except where noted all translations are by the author. 
3 Most recently, see Duverger, 1996a, p. 501. 
4 In a more recent work, O’Neill provides an expanded but essentially 
similar definition of semi-presidentialism (O’Neill, 1997, p. 217). 
5 More contentiously, Duverger has also recently claimed that the 
reformed Israeli system should be classed as a ‘semi-parliamentary’ 
regime because, here, the source of popular legitimacy is solely legislative 
(Duverger, 1996b, pp. 117-9). 
6 Interestingly, the origin of this argument appears to have been 
misunderstood by certain eminent scholars. Vedel’s observation was 
meant to be taken as a direct criticism of the concept of semi-
presidentialism. In reply, Duverger quotes Vedel and provides a 
counterargument (Duverger, 1980, p. 186). The fact that, firstly, in his 
reply Duverger acknowledges Vedel’s article to be “brilliant” and, 
secondly, that Duverger’s counterargument is written in a rather 
incomprehensible form of English seems to have fooled various people 
into thinking that Duverger was arguing that the Fifth Republic should be 
considered as a synthesis of presidential and parliamentary systems. This 
is not the case. So, Linz is actually agreeing with Vedel’s criticism of 
Duverger and not with Duverger’s own point in his discussion of semi-
presidentialism (Linz, 1994, p. 52). The same is also true for Lijphart 
(Lijphart, 1992, p. 8) and Shugart and Carey (Shugart and Carey, 1992, p. 
23). In the case of Shugart and Carey, this misunderstanding would seem 
to question their whole rationale for dismissing Duverger’s formulation of 
semi-presidentialism (ibid). 
7 Some writers, such as Stepan and Skach (Stepan and Skach, 1993, p. 6) 
and Lijphart (Lijphart, 1992, p. 8), state that Duverger himself makes this 
argument when he declares that whereas “[t]he constitutions of Austria, 
Iceland and Ireland are semi-presidential … [p]olitical practice is 
parliamentary” (Duverger, 1980, p. 167). In fact, Duverger does not makes 
this argument at all. Indeed, in this very quotation he clearly states that 
these countries are semi-presidential even if they are all examples of semi-
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presidential regimes with weak heads of state and strong heads of 
government which is similar to the situation in many parliamentary 
systems. So, it may well be that, as Duverger stated on another occasion, 
“practice [in Austria, Iceland and Ireland] is closer to that of parliamentary 
regimes than the other semi-presidential regimes” (my italics) but this does 
not mean that Duverger is actually classifying these countries as 
parliamentary (Duverger, 1986c, p. 8). 
8 This definition is very similar to the one adopted by Linz above. 
Somewhat strangely, though, Linz states that countries such as Austria, 
Iceland and Ireland should not be classed as semi-presidential when, 
according to his own definition, they clearly should. 
9 In his 1980 article, Duverger stated that his definition was “defined only 
by the content of the constitution” (Duverger, 1980, p. 166). However, as 
was demonstrated above, Duverger’s stipulation that in semi-presidential 
regimes presidents had to possess quite considerable powers somewhat 
undermined this statement and certainly confused the issue. 
10 This contrasts with O’Neill’s reformulation of the term (see above) 
which is very different to Duverger’s definition and which stretches the 
concept beyond breaking point. 
11 This list includes regimes which are only slightly democratic. 
12 See, for example, the following: Duverger, 1978, pp. 120-36;  Duverger, 
1980, pp. 177-86; Duverger, 1992, p. 903; and Duverger, 1996a, pp. 514-7. 
13 In his 1980 article Duverger indicates that these are two separate 
variables but the analysis is the same (Duverger, 1980, pp. 182-5). 
